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Abstract
We build a monetary model to show how expected revaluations lead to the
instability of a pegged exchange rate regime. This model assumes current
account convertibility and some degree of capital control, and
fundamentally sound domestic policies and economy, as is the case in
China. The model demonstrates that market-oriented interest rates can act
as an automatic stabilizer to ease revaluation pressures, but cannot resolve
them completely because the nominal interest rate has a zero nominal
bound. Therefore, the official parity will eventually collapse and the
revaluation expectations can be self-fulfilling, in the absence of external
intervention. The empirical results of Granger causality tests are consistent
with the main findings of our theoretical model. There are a number of
alternative policy intervention measures that can extend the life of pegged
exchange rate regime.
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1. Introduction
There are two well-known benefits of a fixed exchange rate regime.
First, a fixed exchange rate transfers the exchange rate risk from the
private sector to the government and hence reduces the market uncertainty
and transaction costs. Thus, a fixed exchange rate can encourage
international trade and investment, and therefore promote economic
growth. The second benefit is the anchor effect of the fixed exchange rate
that can help stabilize the domestic price level. A great deal of empirical
evidence supports these conclusions (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2002; Reinhart
and Rogoff, 2004).
Many developing countries officially choose a fixed exchange rate
regime. In addition many other emerging economies have adopted de facto
fixed exchange rate regimes, although officially they are floating ones
(Calvo and Reinhart, 2001; Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). For example,
according to the Regulations on Foreign Exchange of China, which was
implemented in 1996 and revised in 1997, China officially has a managed
floating exchange rate regime. However, since 1998 China has effectively
adopted a fixed exchange rate regime that pegged Chinese currency
renminbi in a tight range against the US dollar at a rate of 8.28.
However, according to Fischer (2001), only a currency board and
dollarization are sustainable (hard-pegged) fixed exchange rate regimes.
All other soft-pegged exchange rate regimes will eventually be given up,
be converted into hard-pegged, or switched to free floating ones. This
polarization of the exchange rate regimes implies that the intermediate
arrangements of the exchange rate regimes are intrinsically unstable.
Although the three generation models in the literature illustrate various
causes of devaluations of the currencies (Eichengreen, Ross and Wyplosz,
3

1995; Ma and Kanas, 2000; Tsang and Ma, 2002), they did not analyze the
pressure for revaluation.
After China joined the WTO in 2001, expectations for renminbi
revaluation have been increasing rapidly due to China’s persistent trade
surplus and large amount of foreign capital inflows (Ma, 2001). In 2002,
the item of errors and omissions in China’s balance of payments swung to
US$7.8 billion from –US$4.9 billion in 2001 (State Administration of
Foreign Exchange of China, 2001, 2002), which indicates to some extent
the size of capital inflows brought by speculators to bet on a sharp
appreciation of the renminbi. Although the item of errors and omissions
was about US$4.7 billion in the first-half of 2003 (State Administration of
Foreign Exchange of China, 2003), a report suggested that US$20 to 25
billion of “hot money” sneaked into mainland China (Zhao, 2004). Another
estimate suggested that there might be US$ 50 billion of “hot money”
entered China through various channels (Kynge，2004). These higher
estimates are approximately equal to the amount of foreign direct
investment in China over the same period.
After several years of resistance, China eventually made a modest
2.1% revaluation of RMB in July 2005, and switched to a flexible
exchange rate system based on the reference value of a basket of currencies
(People's Bank of China, 2005). So far, the RMB apparently still links to
the US dollar implicitly, albeit under a widened trading band. This may
continuously invite speculative capital inflows. A large scale inflow of
“hot money” will threaten the stability of the money supply in China. If the
monetary authority can not dissolve the revaluation pressure, the renminbi
will have to be revalued again in the near future. Thus, revaluation
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expectations would be self-fulfilling, similar to the outcome of devaluation
expectations (Obstfeld, 1996).
This paper extends the theoretical monetary model with sticky-price
under continuous-time developed by Sun and Ma (2005) to show that
persistent appreciation pressure will cause excess accumulation of
international reserves. The main findings of this paper are that
market-oriented interest rates can act as an automatic stabilizer to ease the
appreciation pressures, but cannot resolve them to ensure a stable pegged
exchange rate regime. If there is not any external intervention from the
government, the pegged parity will finally collapse under appreciation
pressures. Our model highlights some optional intervention measures and
suggestions for system reform in China.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: A sticky-price
continuous-time monetary model under the pegged exchange rate regime is
built in Section 2, showing how an external expectation shock gives rise to
appreciation pressure. In Section 3, the model is adapted to explain the
automatic stabilization effect of the market-oriented interest rate in
relieving appreciation pressures and its limit as an automatic stabilizer. In
Section 4, we employ Granger causality tests to examine the main findings
of our theoretical model. Policy options are discussed in Section 5, based
on an analysis of changes in major parameters of the model that trigger or
postpone currency crisis. A summary is provided in Section 6.

2. Emergence of appreciation pressures
Our sticky-price continuous-time monetary model begins with a
conventional money demand function:
M d(t) / P(t) = k Y - h r(t)

(1)
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Where Md(t) is the domestic nominal money demand at time t, P(t)
represents a price index and, according to the sticky-price hypothesis, it is
assumed P(t)≡1; Y is the real GDP; r(t) is the nominal interest rate at time t,
k and h are fixed parameters representing the sensitivity of money demand
to national income and the interest rate respectively.
Then, the money supply function is:
M s(t) = m[D + R(t)]

(2)

Where M s (t) is the nominal money supply at time t, D represents
domestic credit of the central bank that is taken as a constant; this implies
the central bank executes its monetary policies independent of fiscal
policy1. R(t) represents the official foreign exchange reserve denominated
in domestic currency, and m represents the monetary creation multiplier.
Assuming that the domestic monetary market maintains instantaneous
equilibrium, namely

M d(t) = M s(t) , then

r(t)=[k Y - mD - mR(t) ] / h

(3)

In the domestic goods market, GDP is determined by autonomous
expenditures A and interest rate:
Y = A – b r(t)

(4)

where b is a fixed parameter representing the sensitivity of national income
to the interest rate.
Substituting (4) into (3), we get the equilibrium interest rate,
r(t)=[kA - mD - mR(t) ] /(kb+ h)

(5)

Define the “desired” demand for net domestic assets as:
K*(t) = s[r(t) - r* - Ė(t) - λ]

(6)

In the first-generation model of currency crisis (Krugman, 1979; Flood and Garber, 1984), it
assumes that domestic credit increases with the rise of fiscal deficits; currency crisis is
triggered by improper domestic policies. The model in this paper is different from the first
generation model in this point.
1
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where K*(t) represents the net stock of domestic assets that investors desire
to hold at time t. The nominal foreign interest rate, r*, is assumed to be a
constant to simplify the analysis. The term Ė(t) represents the expected
appreciation rate. When there is a common expectation that the domestic
currency will be revalued, we have Ė(t)<0. Then r-r*- Ė(t) represents the
excess rate of return on domestic assets over foreign assets. We assume
that Ė(t)= -ϕ t, where ϕ is a constant and is defined as the appreciation
expectations shock to capital account. The term λ is a positive risk
premium parameter measuring the degree of asset substitutability
(Krugman and Obstfeld, 2000; Meredith and Ma, 2002; Ma, Meredith and
Yiu, 2002). If λ =0, then domestic and foreign assets are perfect substitutes,
and the choice of assets from different countries and the amount held will
only depend on the excess rate of return on domestic assets over foreign
assets. If λ>0 ,then investors consider that the risk on domestic assets will
be higher than that on foreign assets and if the rate of return on domestic
assets equals to that on foreign assets, investors prefer to hold foreign
assets. The substitution of assets is mainly determined by the
macroeconomic environment, especially by international differences in
financial systems, which may be affected by policies in the short run and
also may be changed with the evolution of financial markets in the long
run. Since China is a developing country with a large amount of
nonperforming loans, this paper considers the circumstance of λ>0. Finally,
s is a positive parameter which measures the sensitivity of asset demand to
the excess rate of return.
Therefore (6) can be rewritten as:
K*(t) = s[r(t) - r* + ϕ t - λ]

(7)

Let k(t) represent the actual net stock of domestic assets, and it may
7

not equal K*(t) until investment portfolios have been adjusted to the
desired levels. Actual net foreign capital inflow at time t is assumed to be a
partial adjustment process,
dK(t)/dt = θ [K*(t) - K(t)]
= θ s [r(t) - r* ] + θ s ϕ t - θ sλ - θ K(t)

0≤θ ≤+∞

(8)

where θ is the capital adjustment coefficient reflecting the degree of capital
mobility. Theoretically, international capital mobility reflects the possibility,
cost and time lag for adjustment of existing portfolios towards desired
levels; while in practice, the degree of capital mobility is not only
restrained by international settlement facilities, but also by rules of capital
control, which can be totally changed overnight. With the extreme
convenience of transactions provided by the international capital market, θ
is mainly dependent on how the authorities operate capital control. If θ=
+∞, it means there is free, unrestricted capital flow, and investors can
adjust their portfolios to desired levels instantaneously and capital mobility
is perfect. If θ = 0, capital movement is under full control and cannot move
at the will of investors. If 0<θ<+∞, capital is under partial control,
incomplete mobility exists, and at each moment, adjustment of capital
stock can only make up part of the gap between K(t) and K*(t). According
to current regulations and policies, mobility of international capitals is
under partial control in China (Guo, 2003). So this paper assumes
0<θ<+∞.
To simplify the analysis, this paper also assumes that when t = 0, the
net capital stock is zero, the monetary market is in equilibrium, and the
domestic interest rate is identical to the foreign one:
K(0)=0 , r(0) =[ k A - m D -m R(0) ] /(kb+ h) , r(0) = r*
8

(9)

The balance of international payments equals the rate of change of
official foreign exchange reserve dR(t)/dt. It is the sum of the net capital
inflow, dK(t)/dt, and the balance on current account CA:
dR(t)/dt = dK(t)/dt + CA

(10)

In a standard analysis, the domestic and foreign national incomes, real
exchange rate, marginal propensity to import and taste are independent
variables in the function of CA. Although it is assumed that domestic
income shall grow with the decrease of interest rate and imports will
increase, exports may grow with the increase of the supply capacity, and
the real exchange rate will be fixed under the pegged regime and
sticky-price assumption. For simplicity, the CA is assumed to be constant.
Thus, the Current Account is an autonomous variable for economic agents,
which is fully reflected in international payment statement under current
account convertibility (Sun, 2003).
Integrating both sides of (10) with respect to t, we obtain the foreign
exchange reserve held by central bank up to t:
R(t) = R(0) + K(t) + CA t

(11)

Where R(0) is the initial level of foreign exchange reserve.
Based on (8) and (5), we obtain
dK (t )
=θ
dt

 kA − mD − mR(t )

s
− r * + θ sϕ t − θK (t )
kb + h



- θsλ

(12)

Substituting (11) and (9) into (12):
dK (t )
=θ
dt

 kA − mD − mR(0) − mK (t ) − mCAt

s
− r * + θ sϕ t − θK (t )
kb + h



 − mK (t ) − mCAt 
= θ s
 + θ sϕ t − θK (t )
kb + h



- θs λ

- θs λ
(13)

Rearranging (13), we have
dK(t)/dt + α K(t) = -β t - θs λ

(14)
9

where

α = θ sm/(kb+ h) +θ = θ (δ+1) > 0，
β = θ [s mCA/(kb+ h) - s ϕ] = θ(δCA- s ϕ),

(14a)

δ = s m/(kb+ h) > 0.
The solution of (14) is
K (t ) = (1 − e −α t )

β
β
−t
- θ sλ (1 − e −α t ) /α
2
α
α

(15)

Differentiating both sides of (15) with respect to t, we obtain
dK (t )
−α t β
= −(1 − e )
α
dt

- θ sλ e −α t

(16)

Substituting (16) into (10), and we find that the balance of
international payment is dependent on the current account balance CA,
appreciation expectations shock ϕ, degree of capital mobility θ and other
parameters:
dR (t ) dK (t )
−α t β
=
+ CA = − (1 − e )
dt
dt
α

= CA

1+ δ e

−α t

1+ δ

+ sϕ

−α t

1− e
1+ δ

- θ sλ e −α t + CA

- θ s λ e −α t

Denote the balance of international payments as: ∆(t)≡

(17)
dR (t )
.
dt

Given the revaluation expectations shock to the capital account (ϕ >0)
and surplus on current account (CA >0), we have ∆(t) >0 if the risk
premium λ=0. By continuity, there exists a positive number λ1>0, such
that for a small risk premium λ∈[0, λ1], we have

∆(t) >0.

(17a)

A positive balance of payments implies a continuous accumulation of
international reserves. The consequence is that the expectation of
10

appreciation may be self-fulfilled.
However, the risk premium λ in a developing country could be quite
high. That would offset the capital inflow induced by the excess rate of
return on domestic assets and would release some of the appreciation
pressure. China as a developing country has an immature financial market
and a large amount of nonperforming loans in the banking sector. Hence
China might have a significant high risk premium λ on her domestic assets.
Nevertheless, the Chinese government provides implicit insurance for its
financial system that effectively has reduced the risk premium. As a result,
the risk premium cannot offset the hot money inflow attracted by the
revaluation expectations on the Chinese currency renminbi. The estimated
large amount of hot money inflow (see Section 1) indeed indicated that
speculators did not perceive the Chinese assets were highly risky.
Therefore, in the remaining part of the paper, we will focus on the case that
there is a revaluation pressure, i.e., we assume ∆(t) >0 for the remaining
part of the paper.

3. The market-oriented interest rate as an automatic stabilizer to the
pegged exchange rate regime and its limitations
Flexible adjustment of market interest rates may affect both the
domestic money market and the international payment in a interconnected
way: Equation (1) indicates that domestic money demand is a decreasing
function of the interest rate, and equation (3) shows that the equilibrium
interest rate in the domestic money market and international reserves are
negatively correlated with each other. In the case of a positive shock to
international payments, an increase in international reserves will result in
an increase in the domestic money supply. An excess money supply causes
11

market interest rates to fall which stimulates the domestic demand for
money, and when the increased domestic money demand equals the
increase in money supply, the equilibrium in the domestic money market is
restored. This process shows partially the mechanism of market-oriented
interest rate in the domestic monetary market (Sun, 2000), but it is not the
whole picture of the function of market-oriented interest rate. With respect
to international payments, we can see from equation (8) that the net capital
inflow is an increasing function of domestic interest rates. When a positive
shock to international payments occurs, a fall in domestic interest rates
reduces the capital inflow and may give rise to capital outflow, which
reduce excess accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and ease
appreciation pressures. Inasmuch as

1+ δ e

−α t

1+ δ

<1，

−α t

1− e
1+ δ

<1, equation (17)

shows that the overall balance of international payment surplus shall be
smaller than the sum of current account surplus and revaluation
expectations shock to the capital account. Therefore, market-oriented
interest rates can facilitate the stability of the exchange rate parity, which
acts as the automatic stabilizer to a pegged exchange rate regime.
Furthermore, as shown in equation (8) the influence of the automatic
stabilizer is dependent on θ. When θ is large, which means a high level of
openness of the capital account, a large amount of capital outflow will be
occurred by a small decrease in interest rate. That will ease significantly
the revaluation pressure from the excess accumulation of foreign exchange
reserves.
However, we can see from equation (17) that the interest rate
adjusting mechanism has its limit. In the case of a shock of revaluation
expectations and a persistent current account surplus, namely ϕ>0 and CA
12

>0, respectively, domestic interest rates can fall, yet the capital outflow
resulting from this is not sufficient to offset the capital inflow caused by
the shocks; the interest rate adjusting mechanism cannot reverse the trend
of escalating foreign exchange reserves. That is, when the balance of
payment ∆(t) >0, the domestic money supply continues to increase, and
nominal domestic interest rates drop persistently according to equation (3).
When the nominal interest rate reaches zero, it cannot fall any further.
Then the pegged exchange rate collapses.
Assume at t = tA, r(tA) = 0, i.e., the nominal interest rate can not be
lowered any more and foreign exchange reserves rise to the maximum
level according to equation (5):
R(tA) = A k/ m - D

(18)

Although the mechanism of market-oriented interest rate can act as
the automatic stabilizer for a pegged exchange rate regime, the effect is
limited and is not strong enough to maintain the pegged parity.
It is indicated from the above analysis that the mechanism of
market-oriented interest rate can ease some of the revaluation pressure
induced from the excess accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, yet
the market mechanism with its automatic adjustment can not fully resolve
the effects from the shock, notwithstanding prudent domestic monetary
policies. To resolve the appreciation pressures and maintain a pegged parity,
additional prevention measures may have to be applied.
To illustrate the solution of our model, we depict the four time paths
of hot money, official foreign reserves, money supply, and nominal interest
rate in Figs 1 to 4, respectively. Fig 1 shows the increase of hot money
over time and Fig 2 gives the picture of rising official foreign reserves due
to foreign exchange market (non-sterilized) interventions by the central
13

bank in dealing with hot money inflow. The impact of growing reserves on
money supply is illustrated in Fig 3. Finally, Fig 4 presents the falling
nominal interest rate to maintain the money market equilibrium and the
time of collapse of the pegged exchange rate regime when the interest rate
hits the zero floor.

time

0

time

0

0

time
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0

time

4. Empirical evidence
To test the main conclusions of our theoretical model, we examine the
Granger causalities (a) from foreign reserves to M2 and (b) from M2 to
interest rate. We utilized monthly data over the sample period of January
2001 to July 2002.
We chose this sample period based on the following observations.
Before year 2000, Asian emerging economies were experiencing
devaluations due to the lagged effects of Asian financial crisis. Exports of
China also suffered significant negative impacts. The slowdown in
economic growth in China presented a devaluation pressure to renminbi.
Since year 2000, the devaluation pressure on renminbi has gradually been
released due to the increasing exports of China. The international pressure
on renminbi revaluation started after 2001.
There are two early articles to suggest renminbi revaluation. One is
“China’s cheap money” published in Financial Times (2001). The other is
“Expectations of renminbi revaluation – an advancement of the theory of
Chinese threat” published in Japanese Economic News (2001) (see Tan
and He, 2003). Some Chinese scholars also recommended a “moderate
revaluation” of renminbi (see, for example, Zhang, 2003). On the other
hand, there are scholars argued that a stable renminbi is beneficial for both
15

China and world economies (see, for example, McKinnon and Schnab,
2003)
Since 2001, Chinese foreign reserves has been increasing dramatically
due to the surpluses on both capital account and current account as well as
repeated, non-sterilized, interventions by the People’s Bank of China on
the foreign exchange market. That had increased the money supply (cf. Fig
5). The consequence was the continuous decline of interbank interest rates
(cf. Fig 6).
Fig 5. Log of Foreign Exchange Reserves (LNFER), M2 (LNM2) and
CPI (LNCPI)
(Jan. 2001 to July 2002)
7.5
7.0
6.5
6.0
5.5
5.0
4.5
01:01

01:04

01:07

01:10

LNFER

LNM2

02:01

02:04

02:07

LNCPI

Source: People's Bank of China, China Monthly Economic Indicators.
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Fig 6. Seven-day Interbank Interest Rate
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7-day interbank rate

Source: China Statistical Information & Service Centre.
Our theoretical model explained quite well of this whole development.
However, the People’s bank of China started to buy in treasury bills in the
open market to sterilize the increase of money supply resulted from the rise
of foreign reserves. This led to the rebound of interbank interest rate. For
simplicity, we did not consider the issue of sterilization in our theoretical
model; hence, we did not consider this issue in our empirical work also.
The monthly data source of foreign reserves (FER) and M2 is
People’s bank of China. CPI is obtained from “China’s Economic Prospect
Monthly”. Nominal value-added of industry (VAI) and the interbank
interest rate (IIR07) are from China Economic Information Centre. Since
China did not publish monthly GDP series, we approximate it by the
value-added of industry series.
According to the Phillips-Perron unit root tests, we found all time
series are I(1) (cf. Table 1).
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Table 1. Unit Root Test
Phillips-Perron test statistic

Variable name

Conclusion

H0: I(1)(level)

H0: I(2)( 1st difference)

lnFER

0.228190

-3.080867*

I(1)

lnM2

-2.478580

-4.981554*

I(1)

IIR07

0.973261

-3.128625*

I(1)

lnVAI

-3.476153

-4.173924*

I(1)

lnCPI

-1.882243

-4.360283*

I(1)

Notes: * significant at the 5% level for rejection of null hypothesis of a unit
root. Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 2. All variables are in logs except
7-day interbank interest rate IIR07. Sample period: Jan. 2001 to July 2002.

From the Johansen cointegration test, we found foreign reserves
（lnFER）and M2（lnM2）have one cointegration relationship. The
cointegration equation for the sample period of Jan. 2001 to July 2002 is：
lnM2 = 0.51 lnFER + 3.33 Constant + cointegration error term
This indicates that money supply equation (2) holds. According to the
vector error-correction estimation, foreign reserves do Granger cause to
M2. Although foreign reserves is not significant in the short run in the M2
equation, the error correction term is significant, which indicates that when
the foreign reserves and M2 deviate from their long run relation, there is an
automatic adjustment mechanism to restore the long run equilibrium (cf.
Table 2).
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Table 2. Error-correction Equation of lnM2 (Jan. 2001 to July 2002)
Explanatory Variables

Coefficient

Standard errors

t-statistics

Cointegration error term(-1)

-0.679063

0.24727

-2.74623*

D(lnM2(-1))

0.129019

0.24998

0.51611

D(lnM2(-2))

-0.422221

0.24721

-1.70792

D(lnFER(-1))

0.019002

0.22569

0.08419

D(lnFER(-2))

-0.404683

0.24010

-1.68548

Constant

0.022203

0.00673

3.29944*

Adj. R-squared

0.358180

S.E. of regression

0.005923

Note: * significant at the 5% level.

From the Johansen cointegration test, we found 7-day interbank
interest rate (IIR07), lnM2 and lnCPI also have one cointegration
relationship. The cointegration equation for the sample period of Jan. 2001
to July 2002 is：
IIR07 = -6.30 lnM2 + 13.30 lnCPI + cointegration error term
According to the error-correction estimation, lnM2 does Granger
cause to interest rate. In the short run, lnM2, lnCPI and output (lnVAI) do
not affect interest rate significantly. However, in the long run, the
error-correction mechanism will adjust the interest rate to the equilibrium
relationship (cf. Table 3).
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Table 3. Error-correction equation of interest rate IIR07 (Jan. 2001 to July 2002)
Explanatory Variables

Coefficient

Standard Error

t-Statistic

Cointegration error term(-1)

-0.031165

0.012643

-2.465040*

D(lnM2(-1))

1.819183

1.487152

1.223267

D(lnCPI(-1))

-1.054388

1.576450

-0.668837

D(lnVAI(-1))

-0.090045

0.092041

-0.978310

D(IIR07(-1))

-0.034723

0.292120

-0.118864

Adjusted R-squared 0.243471

S.E. of regression

0.032885

Note: * significant at the 5% level.

This conclusion is consistent with our recent findings that M2 did not
Granger cause CPI during the period of January 2000 to June 2002 (Sun
and Ma, 2004).From the cointegration equation of interest rate, lnM2 and
lnCPI, we also found that the long-run elasticity of CPI with respect to M2
is 0.48, which is less than unity. According to the error-correction
estimation of lnCPI, lnM2 does not Granger cause to lnCPI. In the short
run, lnM2, IIR07 and output (lnVAI) do not affect lnCPI significantly. In
the long run, the error correction mechanism will not adjust the interest
rate to the equilibrium relationship (to save space, we did not present the
details of the test results, which are available on request). This implies that
the price index of China is not sensitive to the money supply within our
sample period. All these arguments give support for the sticky-price
assumption in our theoretical model.

5. Alternative strategy for government
By combining equation (15) and (11), and we can see that
international reserves are determined by the initial level of foreign
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exchange reserve, the expected appreciations, the external shock to the
current account:
β
β  β
−t
+ 2 + CA t - θ sλ (1 − e −α t ) /α
2 
α α
α 

R(t) = R(0) - e −α t 

(19)

Then insert (18) into (19), we obtain
R(0) -

e

−α t A

β
β  β
α 2  + α 2 − ( α − CA) tA
 

- θ sλ (1 − e −α t ) /α
A

= A k/ m - D(20)

This indicates that the life of a pegged exchange rate tA is a implicit
function of revaluation expectation shock (ϕ), the risk premium of
domestic assets λ, the mobility of international capital θ, and autonomous
expenditure A. Based on this function, partial derivatives of tA with respect
to the above variables can be determined, and through analyzing the effects
of these derivatives, suggestions for constructive strategy can then be put
forward.
(1) Expected revaluation shock (ϕ)
Based on equation (20), we have
dt A
=
dϕ

−

sθ

α

[t A −

1

α

(1 − e

−α t A

)]

(21)

∆(t A )

By defining the function in the brackets of the numerator as f(t)
=t−

1

α

(1 − e

−α t

),

we have f(0) = 0, when t>0, we have

tA −

f(t) is a positive monotonic increasing function, therefore

1

α

(1 − e

tA −

1

α

−α t

) namely,

(1 − e

−α t

) >0.

When the balance of international payment continues to be positive,

∆(tA)>0 [cf. (17a)], we have dt A
dϕ

< 0,

and this indicates that if the size of the

appreciation shock (ϕ) to the capital account is reduced, then the pegged
exchange rate regime can be stabilized. In terms of China’s current
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situation, consideration can be given to the repeated government
declaration that there will be no revaluation.

The government has also

sought to reduce speculative pressures through discussion of the Qualified
Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) system, so as to boost the outflow
of capital and offset a greater amount of capital inflow.
(2)

Risk premium λ

Based on equations (20), we have
−α t

A
) /α
dt A θ s (1 − e
=
dλ
∆(t A )

>0

(22)

This means that if the risk premium λ goes up, the lifetime tA of the pegged
rate will be extended. The risk premium will act as a natural barrier to keep
the speculative capital outside the door. But when there are high
appreciation pressures already, government’s action to reduce the risk
premium of domestic assets may induce more speculative capital inflow
and shorten the life of the pegged exchange rate system.
(3)

International mobility of capital (θ)

Based on equation (20), we have
−α t
β 1 − e
−α t 
−α t
− t Ae
 + t A sλe

θα  α

A

A

dt A
=
dθ

∆(t A )

A

(23)

Define the function in the brackets of the numerator as g(t)=
1− e

α

−α t

− te

−α t

, we have g(0)=0, when t>0, we have dg(t)/dt= tα e −α t >0,

Namely, g(t) is a positive monotone increasing function, therefore
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1 − e −α t A
−α t 
− t A e A  >0.

 α


Nevertheless, the impact of capital mobility (θ) on life of pegged
exchange rate tA depends on the relative sizes of the current account shock
CA and the revaluation expectations shock ϕ.
The relative size of the revaluation expectations shock ϕ is large

(a)

but the current account surplus shock CA is small.
Assume that both CA=0 and the risk premium λ=0, we have β = -θ sϕ
<0, and hence
−α t
β 1 − e
−α t 
− t Ae


θα  α

A

A

dt A
=
dθ

∆(t A )

< 0.

By continuity, there exist two positive numbers CA* >0 and λ*>0,
such that for
CA∈[0, CA*] and λ∈[0, λ*], then

dt A
dθ

< 0.

This indicates that if the revaluation pressure is dominated by the
revaluation expectations shock ϕ over the current account surplus shock
CA, the resistance capacity of pegged exchange rate can be improved by
enhancing the control over foreign exchange (i.e., reducing θ).
(b)

The relative size of the revaluation expectations shock ϕ is small

but the current account surplus shock CA is large.
Assume that ϕ=0 we have β = θ δ CA > 0, and hence

dt A
dθ

>0.

By continuity, there exist a positive numbers ϕ* >0, such that for ϕ

∈[0, ϕ*] then
dt A
dθ

> 0.
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This shows that if the revaluation pressure is dominated by the current
account surplus shock CA over the revaluation expectations shock ϕ, then
an increase of the control over capital movements (i.e., θ goes down) will
nevertheless impede the outflow of capital, weaken the stability of the
exchange rate parity provided by the interest rate adjustment, and therefore
accelerate the collapse of pegged exchange rate regime. In this
circumstance, the correct government action should be to relax the control
of capital movements (i.e., θ goes up).
From the analyses of (a) and (b) above, we found that when the
revaluation pressures is stemming from sustained balance of payment
surpluses, the authority must identify whether it is brought about by current
account surpluses or by revaluation expectations induced capital inflows.
This is because the foreign exchange control under different circumstances
requires totally different policy actions.

(4) Autonomous expenditure A
Based on equation (20), we have
dt A
=−
dA

k/m
(1 − e

−α t A

β
)( ) − CA
α

=

k/m
>0
∆ (t A )

（24）

Given a positive shock to balance of payments (i.e., ∆( tA )>0), an increase
in the autonomous expenditure will be favourable to the duration of fixed
exchange rate.The increase in autonomous expenditure raises the demand
for money, which absorbs the increase of money supply as a result of the
increase in foreign reserves. That decelerates the downslide of interest rate
and releases the pressure of appreciation.
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6. Summary
The simple open macroeconomic model established in this paper
reflects the economic features of a pegged exchange rate regime: full
convertibility of the current account, partial convertibility of the capital
account, market determined interest rate, sound domestic policies, sound
economic fundamentals, and the existence of a revaluation expectation
shock on international payments. This theoretical model simulates the
appreciation pressures on the pegged exchange rate through pushing down
the interest rate. Our empirical studies support the main results obtained
from our theoretical model. We found that the market-oriented interest rate
mechanism can alleviate, but not completely dissolve, such pressure.
Therefore a currency crisis under appreciation pressure may develop.
However, based on this model we can suggest some options for policy
intervention, which may be utilized to make up for the deficiency of the
automatic stabilizer effect of the interest rate mechanism and to help
maintain the pegged exchange rate.
For example, when the relative size of the revaluation expectations
shock is small but the current account surplus shock is large, the authority
may relax the control of capital movements. This would enhance the
stability of the exchange rate parity provided by the interest rate
adjustment, and therefore delay the collapse of pegged exchange rate
regime. In contrast, if the revaluation pressure is dominated by capital
inflow induced by the revaluation beliefs, then the authority has to tighten
up the capital control to stabilize the pegged exchange rate.
Another finding of this paper is that an increase in the domestic
autonomous expenditure can enhance the role of the interest rate
25

mechanism, delay the excess accumulation of reserves, and help maintain
the pegged exchange rate.
In addition to the short-term policy recommendations, the authors
believe that, in terms of financial system construction, the attitude towards
the acceleration of market-oriented reform of interest rates should be
supported. This is because the acceleration of the market-oriented reform
of interest rates, while improving the allocation of domestic financial
resources, will also help offset the negative impact of revaluation
expectation shocks.
Furthermore, the government should gradually remove the implicit
insurance to the banking system and allow the market to assess the true
risk of Chinese domestic assets which would stop some of the speculative
capital inflows.

Reference
Calvo, Guillermo A., and Carmen M. Reinhart, “Fixing for Your Life”, In
Brookings Trade Forum 2000, edited by Susan M. Collins and Dani
Rodrik. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2001.
Calvo, Guillermo A., and Carmen M. Reinhart. “Fear of Floating”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002, 117 (May): 379–408.
Caramazza，Francesco and Jahangir Aziz, “Fixed or Flexible? Getting the
Exchange Rate Right in the 1990s”, Economic Issues, International
Monetary Fund, 1998, No.13.
Dornbusch, R and F Giavazzi, “Heading off China’s Financial Crisis”,
Policy Papers No. 7 – Strengthening the Banking System in China:
Issues and Experience, Basel: Bank for International Settlements,
1999.
26

Eichengreen, B. A K Rose and C Wyplosz, “Exchange Market Mayhem:
The Antecedents and Aftermath of Speculative Attacks”, Economic
Policy, 1995, 21, 251-296;
Financial Times, “China’s cheap money”, 7 August 2001, London.
Fischer, Stanley, “Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Biploar View Correct?”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2001, Spring; and Finance and
Development, 2001, June.
Flood, R P and P M Garber (1984) Collapsing Exchange-Rate Regimes:
Some Linear Examples, Journal of International Economics, 17(1-2),
1-13.
Guo, Shuqing, Reform of China’s Foreign Exchange Policy and
Management System, Caijing (Finance and Economics) Magazine,
2003, 04/05,66-69.(in Chinese)
Japanese Economic News, “Expectations of renminbi revaluation – an
advancement of the theory of Chinese threat”, 6 September 2001,
Japan.
Krugman, P A, “Model of Balance-of-Payment Crises”, Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking, 1979, 11, 311-25.
Krugman, P A and M Obstfeld, “International Economics Theory and
Policy”, Addison Wesley London. 2000.
Kynge, J, “China in new bid to ease renminbi pressure”, Financial Times,
London, 2004, Feb 28.
Liu, S, Z Zhao, Yue Ma, M Yiu, Y Y Kueh, and S K Tsang, “The Full
Convertibility of Renminbi: Sequencing and Influence”, Hong Kong
Institute for Monetary Research Working Paper, No. 9, 2002, April.

27

Ma, Yue, “China's accession to the WTO: a financial economic analysis of
an irreversible decision”, Economic Research Journal, Beijing, No.12,
pp.9-16, December 2001 (in Chinese).
Ma, Yue and A Kanas, “Testing Nonlinear Relationship among
Fundamentals and Exchange Rates in the ERM”, Journal of
International Money and Finance, (2000)19(1), 135-152.
Ma, Yue, G. Meredith and M.Yiu, “A currency board model of Hong
Kong”, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research Working Paper
No. 1, 2002.
McKinnon, Ronald, and Gunther Schnab, “China: A stabilizing or
deflationary influence in Asia?”, Comparative Studies, No. 7, July
2003 (in Chinese).
Meredith, G and Yue Ma, “The Forward Premium Puzzle Revisited”, IMF
Working Paper No. 02/28, International Monetary Fund, February
2002.
Obstfeld, Maurice, “Models of Currency Crises with Self-fulfilling
Features”, European Economic Review, 1996, 40, 1037-47.
Obstfeld, Maurice, and Alan M.Taylor, “Globalisation in Capital
Markets”，NBER Working Paper No.8846, 2002.
People's Bank of China (PBOC), “Public Announcement of the People's
Bank of China on Reforming the RMB Exchange Rate Regime”, July
21,

2005,

posted

on

the

website

of

PBOC:

http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english//detail.asp?col=6400&ID=542
Reinhart, Carmen M. and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “The Modern History of
Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation”, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 119(1), 1-48, February 2004.

28

State Administration of Foreign Exchange of China, The Balance of
Payments

Statement

of

China

in

2001,

2002,

2003(1-6).

http://www.safe.gov.cn/0430/tjsj.jsp?c_t=6
Sun, Huayu, “Analysis of Policies in the IS-LM Model”, International
Business (in Chinese), 2003, 1, 43-37.
Sun, Huayu, “The instrument of the monetary policy should be directed to
the interest rate from the money supply”, Economic Science, 2000, 1,
13-19 (in Chinese).
Sun, Huayu and Yue Ma, “Money and Price Relationship in China”,
Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 2, 2004.
Sun, H and Y Ma, “Policy strategies to deal with revaluation pressures on
the renminbi”, China Economic Review, 16(2), 103 -117, 2005.
Tan, D and F He, “An analysis of external pressure for renminbi
revaluation”,

Frontier

of

Social

Science,

No.6,

2003,

www.iwep.org.cn/rcif/wp/18.pdf.
Tsang, S K and Yue Ma, “Simulating the Impact of Foreign Capital in an
Open-Economy Macroeconometric Model of China”, Economic
Modelling, 1997, 14,435-78.
Tsang, S K and Yue Ma , “Currency Substitution and Speculative Attacks
on a Currency Board System”, Journal of International Money and
Finance, 2002, 21, 53-78.
Zhang, Zhichao (2003) “The Chinese Exchange Rate Policy at the
Crossroad:

Revaluation

and

Liberalization”, mimeo,

Durham

University.
Zhao, Renfeng, , “No quick action on forex reserves”, China Business
Weekly, Beijing, No.4, 2004, January 20, p.1.

29

